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ABSTRACT
If the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper (Ap-
ple) had hewed to the precedent established by Ohio v. American Ex-
press Co. (Amex), it would have begun its antitrust inquiry with the
observation that the relevant market for the provision of app services is
an integrated one, in which the overall effect of Apple’s conduct on both
app users and app developers must be evaluated. A crucial implication
of the Amex decision is that participants on both sides of a transac-
tional platform are part of the same relevant market, and the terms of
their relationship to the platform are inextricably intertwined.
We believe the Amex Court was correct in deciding that effects fall-
ing on the “other” side of a tightly integrated, two-sided market from
challenged conduct must be addressed by the plaintiff in making its
prima facie case. But that outcome entails a market definition that
places both sides of such a market in the same relevant market for anti-
trust analysis.
As a result, the Amex Court’s holding should also have required a
finding in Apple that an app user on one side of the platform who
transacts with an app developer on the other side of the market, in a
transaction made possible and directly intermediated by Apple’s App
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Store, is similarly deemed to be in the same market for standing
purposes.
Under the proper conception of the market, it is difficult to main-
tain that either side does not have standing to sue the platform for al-
leged anticompetitive conduct relating to the terms of its overall pricing
structure, whether the specific terms at issue apply directly to that side
or not. Both end users and app developers are “direct” purchasers from
Apple—of superficially different products, but in a single, inextricably
interrelated market. Both groups should have standing and should be
able to establish antitrust injury—harm to competition—by showing
harm to either group, as long as they can establish the requisite interre-
latedness of the two sides of the market.
As we discuss, such a result would have been consistent with the
way antitrust doctrine has long evolved—in both its substantive and
its procedural aspects—to reflect new economic knowledge, particu-
larly with respect to such “nonstandard” business models.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts adopt and apply antitrust procedure in the shadow of sub-
stantive theory. Procedural rules, especially those affecting the pro-
duction and persuasiveness of evidence, map onto (or should map
onto) economic theory, incorporating and defining presumptions and
burdens that reflect the underlying theory and the evidence required
to prove or refute it. As scholars, courts, and practitioners better un-
derstand evolving theories of harm and apply them to novel circum-
stances, the process of antitrust adjudication changes—or should
change—along with substance.
As the doctrines and jurisprudence of antitrust law have evolved in
their uniquely common law-like manner,1 courts have expanded and
contracted the scope of substantive liability as economic and judicial
learning have developed. Thus, for example, courts have progressively
shifted their treatment of resale price maintenance from one of per se
illegality to virtual per se legality as their understanding of its eco-
nomic implications has evolved.2 The effect is to shape not only the
contours of available arguments in court, but the procedures by which
they are introduced and proven. The latter determines outcomes at
least as much as the former.
Antitrust deeply depends upon evidence and expert theory in a
way that perhaps no other area of law does. The statutes are terse and
vague,3 and courts fill in their content by identifying theories of eco-
nomic harm and by assessing the empirical and theoretical economic
consequences of business conduct. The primacy, and fluidity, of eco-
nomic learning and evidentiary interpretation mean that procedural
rules with respect to the admissibility and probative value of evidence,
and the burdens of persuasion and proof, are of central importance. So
too are mechanical rules respecting the requirements for the demon-
stration of harm, the ultimate consequence of which may be a determi-
1. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897) (dis-
cussing the common law roots of the Sherman Act).
2. Compare Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), with
Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). See also D.
Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the
Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003 (2014) (discussing
the progression of the vertical per se legality doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy . . . ”).
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nation of the level of evidence required. Crucially, because these
levers define the scope of permissible and prohibited conduct, they
generally map onto economic understandings as well.
Thus, courts generally require antitrust plaintiffs to define the rel-
evant market for analysis not only to circumscribe the amount of evi-
dence and the complexity of its evaluation, but also to align the
claimed injury with economic understanding—in this case, to ensure
that the evidence presented and the court’s analysis reflect an eco-
nomically relevant set of products, consumers, sellers, and commercial
dynamics.
Similarly, courts have: introduced antitrust injury requirements;4
created a distinction between “direct” and “indirect” purchasers;5 es-
tablished a “single entity” defense;6 further limited the scope of mar-
ket definition;7 and created the idea of “cluster markets” to capture a
group of conceptually related products and services,8 among other
things. While each of these doctrines arguably presents a “procedural”
rule,9 each also affects the amount or type of evidence required. For
example, courts frame antitrust injury as a standing requirement, but
establishing standing entails an added burden of proof of injury for
private plaintiffs to make out their prima facie case. So important are
procedure and the shifting of burdens of proof to defining and refining
the content of antitrust law that, not coincidentally, some of the most
important principles in civil procedure generally have been developed
in the antitrust context.10
4. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
5. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
6. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
7. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
8. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); FTC v. Staples Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100
(D.D.C. 2016).
9. Because of the interrelatedness of process and substance, the line between proce-
dural and substantive doctrine in antitrust is often fuzzy. In this Article we refer
to the procedural content of antitrust doctrine when we mean to reference rules
with an analogue in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Substantive antitrust rules, by contrast, are those that relate directly to
antitrust theories of harm rooted in industrial organization (IO) economics. As
noted, some antitrust doctrines, like relevant market, incorporate both.
10. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that the “plain
statement” standard under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires the pleading of facts
beyond the formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding that the im-
plausibility of plaintiff’s claim—based on the economics of predatory pricing—
requires the presentation of more persuasive evidence to survive a summary
judgment motion under FED. R. CIV. P. 56); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S.
27 (2013) (requiring a “rigorous analysis” to establish the predominance of com-
mon issues under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) in order to obtain class certification);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (holding that courts need
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Many of these doctrines are thus anchored against antitrust’s evi-
dentiary burden-shifting framework. Even the per se doctrine may be
seen as both a substantive and an evidentiary rule: once courts have
enough economic theory and judicial experience to establish that cer-
tain conduct is more likely than not anticompetitive, the per se rule
alleviates future plaintiffs’ burdens of production. Thus, in the case of
naked price fixing, where “there is no [activity] which could be made
more efficient by price fixing . . . [t]here is . . . no likelihood of any
consumer benefit flowing from their agreement.”11 Economic knowl-
edge informs that the conduct is unlikely to have procompetitive bene-
fits. Thus, it is proscribed per se, but the per se proscription also
carries with it an evidentiary benefit: such conduct undertaken in the
absence of market power is unlikely to cause harm, but, nevertheless,
evidence of market power is not required to make out a per se case.
“To make market power always an essential element of illegality
would introduce the complexities of market definition into every gov-
ernment prosecution and effectively destroy the advantages of the per
se rule in making rapid and widespread enforcement of the law
possible.”12
The error-cost framework with which these doctrines generally
comport entails consideration of both accuracy and judicial economy,13
and the levers that adjust one similarly adjust the other. Thus, the
doctrines that constitute these levers vary, overlap, and interrelate in
ways that allow more fine-grained adjustments reflecting both eviden-
tiary considerations as well as substantive certainty.
An important consequence of this interrelatedness is that judicial
alteration of one doctrine to accommodate new economic learning will
likely affect the operation of some procedural doctrines as well. In the
face of novel business conduct, novel business models, and novel eco-
nomic circumstances, the degree of substantive certainty reflected in
prior doctrinal rules may be eroded, as may the reasonableness of the
expectation that typical evidentiary burdens accurately comport with
our understanding of competitive harm. Modern technology—particu-
larly the platform business model endemic to many modern technol-
ogy firms—presents a need for courts to adjust their doctrines in the
face of such novel issues, even if doing so adds additional complexity
to the adjudicatory process.
not “conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
whether it may be maintained as a class action.”).
11. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 385 (1966).
12. Id. at 386.
13. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14–15
(1984) (describing how the presumptions of the error-cost framework help courts
to simultaneously focus on efficiently deterring harm, while tending to avoid
wasteful litigation that would deter socially beneficial behavior).
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A. Ohio v. American Express Co. and Apple Inc. v. Pepper:
A Failure of Antitrust Doctrinal Evolution
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Ohio v. American Express Co.
(Amex)14 and Apple Inc. v. Pepper (Apple),15 demonstrate both the na-
ture of the doctrinal levers and their relationship to administrative
and substantive error-costs, as well as the interrelatedness of the doc-
trines themselves. Both cases broadly deal with antitrust doctrine in
the context of two-sided markets: Amex on the question of market defi-
nition in two-sided “transaction” markets, and Apple on the question
of the antitrust standing of platform users on one side of a two-sided
platform to allege injury arising out of allegedly anticompetitive ac-
tions of the platform operator.
In brief, Amex focuses on whether the burden of producing evi-
dence of competitive effects arising out of challenged conduct occur-
ring on the other side of a two-sided market properly belongs to the
plaintiff (as part of its prima facie case); the defendant (as a part of a
procompetitive effects defense); or neither (as “out-of-market” conduct
irrelevant to the decision).16 Apple concerns whether the Illinois Brick
indirect purchaser doctrine precludes consumers of unaffiliated (i.e.,
non-Apple) iOS apps purchased through Apple’s App Store from bring-
ing an antitrust action for alleged overcharge against Apple.17
As we discuss further below, we believe that the Amex Court cor-
rectly decided that effects falling on the other side of a tightly inte-
grated, two-sided market from challenged conduct must be addressed
by the plaintiff in making its prima facie case.18 But, as the Amex
Court made clear, that outcome entails a market definition that places
both sides of such a market in the same relevant market for antitrust
analysis. As a result, the Amex Court’s holding should also have re-
quired a finding in Apple that an app user on one side of the platform
who transacts with an app developer on the other side of the market,
in a transaction made possible and directly intermediated by Apple’s
App Store, should similarly be deemed in the same market for stand-
ing purposes.
14. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) [hereinafter Amex].
15. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
16. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2284–85 (“To assess . . . evidence [of anticompetitive effects],
we must first define the relevant market.”); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (rejecting the idea that, at least for mergers, “anticompe-
titive effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences in
another”).
17. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1514–15.
18. For a more expansive discussion of the propriety of the Court’s analysis and deci-
sion in Amex, see Geoffrey A. Manne, In Defence of the Supreme Court’s ‘Single
Market’ Definition in Ohio v. American Express, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
104 (2019).
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The Court in Apple failed to recognize this connection, however. In
deciding the case in favor of the respondents, the Court reached the
correct result, but its failure to tie its standing analysis to the under-
lying substantive doctrine of Amex is problematic. In particular, the
Court announced a rule that permits more plaintiffs to establish
standing, but it did not direct lower courts to assess standing within
the proper analytical frame. By expanding standing in a manner un-
moored from the underlying economics of the case, the Court has
driven a wedge between interrelated antirust doctrines, doubtless en-
suring future uncertainty, avoidable costs, and erroneous outcomes.
II. THE NEXUS BETWEEN PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE
IN ANTITRUST LAW
The history of modern antitrust is guided by the development of
doctrine under the error-cost framework. In Judge Easterbrook’s ter-
minology, courts apply “filters” to select the cases for enforcement,
evaluate the evidence in those cases, and minimize the combined cost
of erroneous decisions and wasteful litigation.19 This approach serves
as a legal heuristic that optimizes enforcement and reduces what
would otherwise be an unnecessarily large, complicated caseload.
An excessive adherence to formalism, however, enshrines outdated
economic thinking and impedes the common-law development of anti-
trust law in concert with evolving business practices, technology, and
economic learning. The substantive evolution of antitrust doctrine, in
other words, is partially realized through the adaptation of procedural
doctrines to new business realities. Indeed, the development of many
antitrust doctrines reflects the courts’ eventual realization of this.
To take one key example, over time courts relaxed their application
of the procedural per se rule to certain nonstandard contractual rela-
tionships as the advent of more advanced industrial organization eco-
nomics—most notably, transaction costs economics—led to the
realization that per se condemnation is inappropriate for many forms
of conduct even though they depart from a traditional “perfect compe-
tition” model.20 Rather than persist in the reflexive application of the
per se rule, courts developed other heuristic doctrines to mitigate the
administrative costs that more complex substantive analysis entailed
19. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 14 (“Courts should use the economists’ way out.
They should adopt some simple presumptions that structure antitrust inquiry.
Strong presumptions would guide businesses in planning their affairs by making
it possible for counsel to state that some things do not create risks of liability.
They would reduce the costs of litigation by designating as dispositive particular
topics capable of resolution.”).
20. See generally Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77 (2003) [hereinafter Price Theory].
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as more conduct became susceptible to full-blown effects analysis
under the rule of reason.21
In the early period of antitrust jurisprudence, however, courts rou-
tinely condemned as per se illegal conduct that was nonstandard and
thus poorly understood.22 The per se rule served as a sensible and
relatively efficient procedural limitation for courts, given that the eco-
nomics of the time remained rooted in undeveloped theories of the
firm.23 For instance, in United States v. Topco Associates:24
[T]he Supreme Court declared the restraints [against territorial exclusivity]
per se unlawful. The Court was not troubled by the absence of consumer in-
jury: it was enough for the majority that the voluntary contractual restraints
purportedly limited the “freedom” of each member of the Association to choose
where and how it would sell Topco-brand products.25
This decision was a product of its time, however. The prevailing neo-
classical economics orthodoxy held that efficiencies could be produced
only by “constant technological rivalry between autonomous firms, un-
constrained by so-called nonstandard contracts; that is, agreements
that constrain the discretion of purchasers and competitors.”26
“Within this tradition, contractual restraints on purchasers after title
passed were viewed as an anomaly—inexplicable except on the hy-
pothesis of ‘leverage’ or other forms of exclusion.”27 Under this unde-
veloped economic paradigm, the per se doctrine functioned as a
filtering mechanism; it was simply known that every contractual re-
straint that a firm imposed on a downstream customer was likely the
result of market power.
As the theory of the firm developed, however, it came to be widely
known that firms engage in a wide variety of contractual relationships
in an effort to manage transaction costs.28 A proper understanding of
21. See infra sections I.A and I.B for discussion of some of these doctrines.
22. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY IS-
SUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (Victor R.
Fuchs ed., 1972) (“[I]f an economist finds something—a business practice of one
sort or another—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explana-
tion. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable
practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation,
frequent.”). This is the so-called “inhospitality tradition” in antitrust. See Easter-
brook, supra note 13, at 4; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 19 (1985).
23. See Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content
of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 471 (2001) [hereinafter Farewell to
Quick Look].
24. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
25. Farewell to Quick Look, supra note 23, at 470.
26. Price Theory, supra note 20, at 80.
27. Farewell to Quick Look, supra note 23, at 468.
28. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost
Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548 (1981); see also R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–91 (1937) (“The cost of negotiating and concluding a sepa-
rate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must
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business conduct undertaken to address the consequences of doing
business in the face of transaction costs means that apparent re-
straints should not be condemned outright, even if they appear to
raise prices or reduce output from the status quo ante, because the
status quo itself may not be optimal. Once transaction costs were bet-
ter understood, many of the apparently restrictive contractual obliga-
tions that were previously presumed to be per se violations came to be
understood as (at least sometimes) procompetitive.29 Perhaps most fa-
mously, in Leegin Creative Leather  Products v. PSKS, Inc., the Court
overturned the longstanding rule that vertical price agreements were
per se illegal, noting that, “as we have stated, a ‘departure from the
rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.’”30 Where, as
here, antitrust doctrine properly evolves, greater economic learning
can, and does, lead to changes in antitrust procedure.
A. Quick Look and the Evolution of the Standards of
Antitrust Review
Take, for example, the court’s creation of the quick look doctrine in
Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems (BMI) and
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents (NCAA).31
The quick look doctrine grew out of the Court’s attempt to adapt anti-
trust standards of review to the novel organizational arrangements of
performing rights organizations (PROs) and amateur sports leagues.
In NCAA, for example, schools were not organized in a traditional firm
hierarchy, nor were they making decisions entirely separately and
contracting at arms’ length in the market.
Confronted with the unique structure of amateur sports markets,
the court neither declined to apply antitrust law nor did it woodenly
apply the per se doctrine against what otherwise looked like price fix-
ing by a cartel. Instead, it altered the process of antitrust review to
also be taken into account. Again, in certain markets, e.g., produce exchanges, a
technique is devised for minimising these contract costs . . . .”).
29. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (stating dealer re-
straints on purchasers no longer per se unlawful); Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (describing price-fixing agreement among horizon-
tal competitors facilitated market for blanket music licensing); State Oil v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997) (applying rule of reason to maximum resale price maintenance);
Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (stating mini-
mum resale price maintenance subject to rule of reason).
30. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887.
31. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 16–17; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101–03 (1984).
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ensure that its analysis reflected a proper consideration of the actual
competitive effects of such restraints.32
BMI presented a similar opportunity for the Court. The American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broad-
cast Music Inc. sought to create a market for “blanket” music licensing
where negotiations among rightsholders and small businesses that
wished to publicly preform their compositions were otherwise too
costly to occur.33 The transaction costs associated with individual art-
ists each negotiating with individual establishments that wished to
play their music were extremely burdensome and, in the absence of a
cost-reducing intermediary like a PRO, resulted in suboptimal out-
comes.34 Although PROs are collusive enterprises at heart, the Court
believed it would have been a mistake to condemn their conduct under
the per se rule and thereby incur the social loss that would occur were
the blanket licensing market strangled in its crib.35
In the face of this economic reality, the Court acknowledged a new
form of antitrust review: quick look review. The quick look process in-
troduced a new procedural element to courts’ review of seemingly an-
ticompetitive conduct: a preliminary, truncated, substantive
assessment of whether the conduct at issue “might plausibly be
thought to have a net procompetitive effect or possibly no effect at all
on competition.”36 Importantly, this tailored doctrine does not neces-
sarily cut in favor of either defendants or plaintiffs: the NCAA failed
the test, while BMI met the test.
In California Dental Associations v. Federal Trade Commission
(Cal. Dental), the Court made it clear that quick look is an appropriate
means of by-passing the rule of reason when “an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the ar-
rangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on cus-
tomers and markets.”37 But, in the same case, the Court adopted a
truncated analysis in order to determine that rule of reason review
was, in fact, required.38
32. This approach was consistent with the Court’s earlier discussion in National So-
ciety of Professional Engineers v. United States, where it opined that its analysis
should be guided by a careful consideration of the actual competitive effects of a
restraint. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
33. See Broad. Music Inc., 441 U.S. at 19–21.
34. Id. at 20–21.
35. Id. 21–23.
36. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999).
37. Id. at 770 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692).
38. Id. at 775 n.12 (“The point is that before a theoretical claim of anticompetitive
effects can justify shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence
of procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires, there must be
some indication that the court making the decision has properly identified the
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In the end, the process reflects the degree to which the underlying
conduct presents novel or nuanced economic circumstances for which
past presumptions and burden-shifting rules may not be appropriate;
it is the substance driving the process. As the Court noted in Cal.
Dental:
Although we have said that a challenge to a “naked restraint on price and
output” need not be supported by “a detailed market analysis” in order to “re-
quir[e] some competitive justification,” it does not follow that every case at-
tacking a less obviously anticompetitive restraint (like this one) is a candidate
for plenary market examination. The truth is that our categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and
“rule of reason” tend to make them appear. We have recognized, for example,
that “there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analy-
sis,” since “considerable inquiry into market conditions” may be required
before the application of any so-called “per se” condemnation is justified.39
B. The Interplay of Procedure and Substance in the
Doctrines of Antitrust Standing
The choice between following an overarching, per se rule of reason
or quick look process reflects the interrelation between substance and
process at a high level. But less all-encompassing doctrines similarly
reflect this interrelatedness. Most relevant to Amex and Apple, courts
have developed more sophisticated approaches to standing (reflected
in both the antitrust injury requirement and the indirect purchaser
doctrine) and market definition to better comport with more complex
and nuanced economic analysis.
Properly accommodating the benefits of novel business models
does not require abandoning careful analysis or the use of all heuris-
tics to reduce administrative costs; it just means shifting the way they
are incorporated into the court’s analysis.
1. Antitrust Injury and Antitrust Standing
Much like the per se standard, the antirust injury doctrine serves
as a filter meant to minimize the cost of adjudicating likely meritless
claims, within the substantive limits of economic theory that defines
which plaintiffs are most likely to have viable causes of action. Unlike
the per se standard, however, antitrust injury does not impose a filter
based on the superficial characteristics of challenged conduct. Rather,
antitrust injury requires a causal relationship between the harm al-
leged and the defendant’s conduct, as well as a determination that the
theoretical basis for the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the ef-
fects actually are anticompetitive.”).
39. Id. at 779 (citations omitted) (emphasis removed).
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alleged harm is proximately related to the sort of conduct that the an-
titrust laws address.40
Not all conduct that causes a plaintiff to overpay, for example, con-
stitutes antitrust injury. To the contrary, it is well established that all
antitrust plaintiffs, including those that allege per se violations, must
prove that their injuries stem from a “competition-reducing aspect or
effect” of the defendant’s behavior.41
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., the Court first de-
veloped the standards that should be applied to guide (and limit) re-
covery of treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Crucial to
the Brunswick Court’s reasoning is the notion that “[t]he antitrust
laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition not competi-
tors’. . . . It is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award damages
for the type of injury claimed here.”42 Thus, the antitrust injury doc-
trine introduced in Brunswick was intended to address the scope of
potential litigation, limiting it to a set of cases cognizable under the
antitrust laws, and unlikely to amount to the subversion of antitrust
laws to benefit competitors.
The judicially developed doctrine seems at least partly intended to
address the threat of excessive litigation by private plaintiffs attracted
by the lure of large damage awards.43 Moreover, when a party alleges
antitrust harm, courts require the demonstration of antitrust stand-
ing.44 This requirement ensures that firms are not merely com-
40. See, e.g., Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“[I]t is not the status as a consumer or competitor that confers antitrust stand-
ing, but the relationship between the defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct and
the resulting harm to the plaintiff.”).
41. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990) [hereinafter
ARCO]; see also Gatt Commc’ns Inc. v. PMC Assocs., 711 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir.
2013) (“It is not enough for the actual injury to be ‘causally linked’ to the asserted
violation.”).
42. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (citing
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). The Court has subse-
quently held the antitrust injury limitation in Brunswick to apply in Sherman
Act and other antitrust cases, as well. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457
U.S. 465 (1982) (applying the antitrust injury rule to a claim brought under the
Sherman Act); ARCO, 495 U.S. 328 (imposing the antitrust injury requirement
on every private antitrust case, irrespective of the statutory source of liability).
43. William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to
Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 467–69 (1980).
44. See ARCO, 495 U.S. at 339 (“Antitrust injury does not arise for purposes of § 4 of
the Clayton Act . . . until a private party is adversely affected by an anticompeti-
tive aspect of the defendant’s conduct”); Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486 n.10 (“The
initial House debates concerning provisions related to private damages actions
reveal that these actions were conceived primarily as ‘open[ing] the door of justice
to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust
laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.’”)
(citations omitted); Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar
Ltd., 833 F.3d 680, 689 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Every private antitrust plaintiff, includ-
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plaining about normal competition (e.g., by requiring a demonstration
that complained-of prices are “predatory” and not just “low”).
Implicit in both doctrines is the understanding that courts now
seek to more accurately parse challenged conduct in order to ensure
that enforcement targets actually harmful conduct and does not deter
socially useful behavior: “The interest of private plaintiffs is to reme-
diate an injury they have suffered or may suffer. The interest of the
government is to ‘prevent and restrain’ violations of the antitrust laws
along with the attendant social costs such violations can cause.”45 A
private plaintiff must show more than simply harm to itself, which
might arise from procompetitive behavior, and the government must
show the likelihood of anticompetitive effects beyond mere harm to a
particular competitor. In both cases, however, the procedural element
of standing is a function of the underlying economic understanding of
the conduct at issue. For injury to be deemed an injury “to competi-
tion, not competitors” requires an understanding of the substantive
economics. In fact, in some cases, a form of market definition analysis
is a requisite component of the antitrust standing analysis:
In order to have antitrust standing, the plaintiff must “have suffered its injury
in the market where competition is being restrained. Parties whose injuries,
though flowing from that which makes the defendant’s conduct unlawful, are
experienced in another market do not suffer antitrust injury.”
. . . .
. . . A “narrow exception” exists to this “market participant” requirement
“for parties whose injuries are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the injuries of
market participants” or with “the injury the conspirators sought to inflict.”46
This proximity determination is thus dependent upon identification of
the relevant market and an understanding of the economic relation-
ship among the actors in that market.
Importantly, for the procedural rules of antitrust standing and an-
titrust injury to make sense, the same economic understanding that
undergirds their determination must apply throughout the antitrust
analysis (if a case proceeds). In other words, a preliminary factual and
economic determination must be made to address standing, even
though the full presentation of evidence and the economic analysis re-
main the province of later stages of the court’s review. Whether it is
the later, fuller analysis that follows from the economic and factual
assumptions upon which standing—and indeed the entire theory of
the case—is based, or whether it is the initial determination that an-
ing those challenging an agreement as unlawful under § 1, must include in its
complaint allegations of ‘antitrust injury.’”).
45. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 842 F.3d 34, 60 (1st Cir. 2016).
46. Lorenzo v. Qualcomm Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting
Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982)).
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ticipates the later analysis, the point remains: the two must be
consistent.
2. The Indirect Purchaser Doctrine
The indirect purchaser doctrine also addresses standing, but, at
first glance, it appears to be less connected to the underlying econom-
ics. Indeed, the indirect purchaser doctrine is often conceived of as a
factual inquiry regarding basic contractual relationships between par-
ties, and not one that turns on the economic consequences of their re-
lationship.47 However, in the face of nonstandard contracting, the
indirect purchaser doctrine also cannot escape the interrelatedness of
process and substance.
The indirect purchaser doctrine arose in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, a case that considered whether a plaintiff, who was not an imme-
diate purchaser, could recover damages from a firm allegedly acting
anticompetitively.48 The plaintiffs sought to recover the “passthrough”
overcharge—that portion of the price that the actual direct purchaser
did not absorb but instead passed along to the plaintiff (called “offen-
sive passthrough”).49 The Court ultimately held that, for reasons of
administrability, only the original purchaser could recover for an-
ticompetitive overcharges, regardless of the extent of passthrough.50
A significant impetus for Illinois Brick’s prohibition on recovery for
offensive passthrough was Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp.51 The Hanover Shoe Court had denied defendants the use of de-
fensive passthrough to claim that the plaintiffs had not in fact been
harmed, but had passed on any increased costs to their own custom-
ers. As in Illinois Brick, the Hanover Shoe Court concerned itself with
the impractical task of accounting for all the intricacies that would
have attended tracking price increases in the face of potential
passthroughs.52
47. See, e.g., Cynthia Urda Kassis, The Indirect Purchaser’s Right to Sue Under Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act: Another Congressional Response to Illinois Brick, 32 AM.
U. L. REV. 1087, 1110 (1983) (“In Illinois Brick the Supreme Court sacrificed fair-
ness for expediency by focusing on a formality such as privity rather than on
determining who actually had suffered an injury. The Court ignored the issues of
compensation and deterrence, the underlying objectives of the treble damage
remedy.”).
48. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977).
49. Id. at 726–27.
50. Id. at 746–47.
51. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
52. Id. at 493 (“Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense would
require a convincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable figures,
the task would normally prove insurmountable. On the other hand, it is not un-
likely that if the existence of the defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defend-
ants will frequently seek to establish its applicability.”).
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Hanover Shoe sought to limit the scope of the antitrust inquiry to a
single, somewhat arbitrary but conceptually simpler, level of analysis:
that of the plaintiffs who made a purchase from a defendant, regard-
less of whether or not they actually absorbed the anticompetitive over-
charge. Such a limitation would enable courts to adjudicate antitrust
cases without excessive and often-pointless administrative expense.
And Illinois Brick created symmetry with Hanover Shoe by ensuring
that defendants who are unable to point to passthrough as a means of
avoiding litigation are not then beset by duplicative, difficult-to-ana-
lyze claims brought by both direct and indirect purchasers:
A one-sided application of Hanover Shoe substantially increases the possibil-
ity of inconsistent adjudications—and therefore of unwarranted multiple lia-
bility for the defendant—by presuming that one plaintiff (the direct
purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while preventing the defendant from
using that presumption against the other plaintiff; overlapping recoveries are
certain to result from the two lawsuits unless the indirect purchaser is unable
to establish any pass-on whatsoever.53
The refusal to account for passthrough (both defensively and offen-
sively) is an administratively minded rule, but it is grounded in the
business realities that were before the Court: a classic vertical separa-
tion between levels of production and distribution. In Illinois Brick,
for example, a concrete manufacturer sold allegedly anticompetitively
priced concrete products to builders and other resellers who, in turn,
used those concrete products in their construction projects. The indi-
rect purchaser doctrine was designed to operate in a traditional, famil-
iar business environment with a strong temporal and course-of-
commerce separation between production, distribution, and
consumption.
In this context, limiting the availability of recovery to only direct
purchasers serves judicial economy without excessively constraining
enforcement in theoretical, nonstandard situations. With clear lines of
separation and a familiar division of activities within a vertical supply
chain, the prospect of deterring recovery by an actually injured party
that does not transact directly with the defendant is unlikely—but it
is not impossible. As we discuss more fully below, nonstandard struc-
tural or contractual arrangements are increasingly common.54
If the indirect purchaser doctrine is to maintain its function as an
error-cost reducing filter, it cannot be applied without regard to con-
text. As nonstandard business arrangements disrupt the reliability of
the implicit assumption of a linear relationship upon which the indi-
53. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 730–31.
54. These arrangements are where intermediaries do not simply incorporate inputs
in a direct supply chain, process them, and pass them on in an end-product to
consumers, but rather facilitate or mediate interactions between other users. In
arrangements like these the “direct” and “indirect” purchaser filters are much
less accurate and much less appropriate.
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rect purchaser doctrine was based, it should be revised to reflect that
shift. Indeed, a less formalistic approach to Illinois Brick would be
consistent with other doctrinal shifts (including those discussed
above) that have followed from a better understanding of the economic
implications of novel business arrangements:
The unqualified nature of the current indirect purchaser rule places it at odds
with the general body of current antitrust law. Modern antitrust, reflecting
the influence of the so-called Chicago School, eschews inflexible formalist rul-
ings that rest on categorical distinctions and instead favors a functionalist
approach designed to maximize social welfare. As economic understanding
and awareness of market conditions have improved, and as alternative scena-
rios arise within different market conditions, courts have adapted antitrust
law to account for and adjust to the different applications. This trend has
eliminated many per se rules in favor of evaluative rules of reason, and has
shifted away from adherence to legal category and stare decisis and instead
explicitly pursues functional objectives.55
III. NONSTANDARD CONTRACTS AND ANTITRUST
DOCTRINE: ACCOMMODATING THE ECONOMICS
OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS IN
ANTITRUST PROCEDURE
Critical to the arguments presented in this Article is that two-
sided platforms often incorporate poorly understood commercial ar-
rangements that warrant a reconsideration of how established anti-
trust doctrines apply in order to avoid their wrongful condemnation.
In the face of evolving facts, procedural consistency and substan-
tive accuracy require that legal doctrines change. Two-sided markets
present novel business arrangements, the competitive dynamics and
implications of which are incompletely captured by existing antitrust
doctrines. The Amex Court’s opinion moved the process of incorporat-
ing the economics of two-sided markets into antitrust doctrine forward
in important ways, adjusting the way courts should assess the rela-
tionships between certain economic actors. Thus, as we discuss below,
following Amex, certain “out of market” effects should become “in mar-
ket” effects”; actors on either side of the platform should frequently be
considered part of the same relevant market; and, critical for cases
like Apple, many parties that were once considered “indirect purchas-
ers” should gain standing as “direct purchasers.”
55. Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Func-
tionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 SO. CAL. L. REV. 69, 81
(2007).
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A. The Basic Economics of Two-Sided Markets
A two-sided platform56 is a business model that creates value by
reducing the transaction costs of direct interactions between two or
more types of users in ways that mere resellers cannot replicate.57 A
critical feature of multi-sided platforms is that the demand of platform
participants is interdependent—the extent of participation by one set
of users on a platform depends on the participation of one or more
other sets of users.58 A multi-sided platform uses both pricing and de-
sign choices to achieve critical mass. Without critical mass on all
sides, the positive feedback effect, which enables the platform’s unique
matching abilities, cannot be achieved.
Further, interdependent demand on platforms often leads to situa-
tions where efficient pricing involves below marginal cost pricing on
one side and above marginal cost pricing on another.59 As a result,
inferences drawn from the traditional indicia of competition—price
and output effects—may be inapposite, particularly when they are as-
sessed on only one side of a multi-sided market or without considera-
tion of the effects on the platform itself.60
It is a well-accepted proposition in the literature that application of
traditional antitrust reasoning is often misapplied to two-sided plat-
forms,61 and vertical restraints on multi-sided platforms can be either
procompetitive or anticompetitive depending on a host of complicated
interactions among the platforms’ users. Thus, rule of reason scrutiny
is normally appropriate in assessing the effects of a vertical restraint
in any particular case.62
Procompetitive vertical restraints on multi-sided platforms may
fall into one or more of at least three broad categories: (1) achieving
56. Two-sided platforms are sometimes called “two-sided markets” and “multi-sided
markets.” We use these terms interchangeably.
57. For a more thorough discussion of the nature of two-sided platforms, see gener-
ally David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-
Sided Platform Businesses, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 405 (Roger Blair & Daniel Sokol eds., 2013).
58. See, e.g., David S. Evans, Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Plat-
forms, Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ. Olin Res. Paper No. 626 (Jan. 2, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195778 [https://perma.unl
.edu/T5CP-QECW].
59. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 57, at 6.
60. For a greater discussion of this limitation on antitrust analysis, see infra notes
61–63 and accompanying text.
61. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 57, at 2 (“[I]t is not possible to know
whether standard economic models, often relied on for antitrust analysis, apply
to multi-sided platforms without explicitly considering the existence of multiple
customer groups with interdependent demand . . . [A] number of results for sin-
gle-sided firms, which are the focus of much of the applied antitrust economics
literature, do not apply directly to multi-sided platforms.”).
62. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–89 (2007).
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economies of scale that provide large benefits to consumers overall;
(2) helping platforms deal with coordination and expectation problems
to the benefit of platform users; and (3) providing benefits to one side
of the platform that increase consumer welfare overall.63 These
procompetitive effects are a function of the particular structure of
such two-sided markets and necessitate adjustments to antitrust doc-
trine to ensure that presumptions and evidentiary burdens properly
reflect the more complicated economic relationships among the parties
involved.
B. Amex, Market Definition, and Effects Analysis
The Amex case, the Court’s first sustained look at market defini-
tion in the context of two-sided markets, resulted in a holding that:
(1) the relevant market must be defined prior to an effects analysis,
and (2) the proper market definition for many two-sided markets en-
compasses both sides of the market.64
First, by requiring the market to be defined prior to the assess-
ment of anticompetitive effects, the Court acknowledges that assess-
ing competitive effects entails “a fact-specific assessment of ‘market
power and market structure . . . to assess the [restraint]’s actual effect
on competition.”65 This in turn requires a market definition: “Without
a definition of [the] market there is no way to measure [the defen-
dant’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition.”66 This reflects the
Court’s realization that “[d]efining which transactions are actually af-
fected by alleged anticompetitive behaviour is necessary for properly
identifying anticompetitive effects.”67
Second, by acknowledging that both sides of a two-sided market
will often be considered part of the same, unified market:
[T]he Court’s rule ensures that the price, quality, and output of the relevant
product are properly considered. This is especially important because, while
output of a two-sided platform may often be measured looking at only one side
(particularly for two-sided transactional platforms where it is presumed that
a transaction on one side also entails a transaction on the other side), price
and non-price product characteristics generally will not be properly measured
by doing so.
. . . .
. . . [D]efining the market to include both sides ensures that the full price
and quality attributes of the product are considered. Where a single, two-sided
product is at issue, the price may be spread across users on both sides of the
63. See Evans, supra note 58, at 8–9.
64. Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018). For a more thorough analysis of the case, see
Manne, supra note 18.
65. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp. 467
U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).
66. Id. at 2285 (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)).
67. Manne, supra note 18, at 106.
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market. Moreover, non-price product characteristics will necessarily differ be-
tween different sets of users. In fact, it is often the case that product quality is
adjusted to users on one side of a platform in order to offer them an effectively
negative price. Given the differential incidence of price and quality across a
platform, it is impossible to capture the competitive dynamics and to measure
the competitive effects by viewing only the partial price on one side.68
1. Implications for the Consideration of “Out-of-Market” Effects
The pro-competitive behaviors mentioned above emerge as a func-
tion of the interconnectedness of two-sided platforms. This intercon-
nectedness complicates the antitrust analysis. In particular, both the
predisposition of a United States v. Philadelphia National Bank
(PNB) and Topco analysis to truncate consideration of “out-of-market”
efficiencies,69 as well as Illinois Brick’s focus on a traditional, manu-
facturing-supply-chain division between production, distribution, and
consumption, are poor fits in the context of two-sided platforms.
The logic of PNB restricts an efficiencies analysis of costs and ben-
efits generated “in-market,” and refuses to consider countervailing ef-
fects in related markets. But with two-sided markets, there is a tight
relationship between both sides of a platform, suggesting that the effi-
ciencies on both sides of the platform are necessarily interlinked and
should be considered together. Maintaining their separation not only
risks misunderstanding the nature of the relevant product market at
issue, but it arbitrarily excludes consideration of some of the counter-
vailing, procompetitive effects of allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
The district court in Amex held that the case involved separate
markets,70 and, citing Topco and PNB, noted that “[a]s a general mat-
ter . . . a restraint that causes anticompetitive harm in one market
may not be justified by greater competition in a different market.”71
Similarly, relying on Topco, Justice Breyer concluded in his Amex dis-
sent that a rule of reason analysis would not permit consideration of
both sides of the market because: “A Sherman Act § 1 defendant can
rarely, if ever, show that a procompetitive benefit in the market for
one product offsets an anticompetitive harm in the market for
another.”72
It is unclear whether Topco applies the logic of PNB—which nomi-
nally relates only to merger cases—to Sherman Act cases.73 But the
68. Manne, supra note 18, at 108–09 (citing Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in
Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees,
73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 583 (2006)).
69. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
70. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
71. Id. at 229 (citing Topco, 405 U.S. at 610 and PNB, 374 U.S. at 370).
72. Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. For further consideration of this question, see Manne, supra note 18, at 115.
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untested assumption that it does so reflects an inappropriate adher-
ence to doctrinal formality over the evolution of doctrine to reflect eco-
nomic substance.74 As noted above, a proper effects analysis is
performed only after a market is defined and market power is as-
sessed.75 Thus, PNB and Topco considerations aside, properly defin-
ing which transactions are actually affected by alleged
anticompetitive behavior is necessary for identifying anticompetitive
effects and judging antitrust standing.
The market-definition approach in Amex will frequently lead to the
conclusion that a different product market, with different partici-
pants, is at issue. The superficially appropriate market separation
that might otherwise result from a different market definition is inap-
plicable—and so is the PNB-like resistance to considering counter-
vailing effects across those markets. In Amex, the product at issue was
not “payment acquisition services provided to merchants,” but “plat-
form services facilitating transactions between cardholders and
merchants.”76 Under the former definition, efficiencies afforded to
cardholders would be out of market; under the latter, both merchants
and cardholders are participants in the same market and the totality
of the effects of allegedly anticompetitive conduct by the platform on
both must be evaluated.
The clear benefits of an early and proper market definition are that
it provides substantive accuracy and a better understanding of the is-
sues throughout all stages of the adjudicatory process. Indeed,
“[a]lleging the relevant market in an antitrust case does not merely
identify the portion of the economy most directly affected by the chal-
lenged conduct; it identifies the competitive process alleged to be
harmed.”77 Particularly where, as in Amex, the relevant economic re-
lationships have been hardly (if at all) considered by the courts, a con-
sistent and accurate market definition is necessary to determine
“what the nature of [the relevant] products is, how they are priced and
on what terms they are sold, what levers [a firm] can use to increase
its profits, and what competitive constraints affect its ability to do
so.”78
74. See, e.g., Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2171 (2018).
75. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
76. Manne, supra note 18, at 109; see also Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (“These platforms
facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction between participants . . . . Transac-
tion platforms are thus better understood as ‘suppl[ying] only one product’—
transactions.” (quoting Klein et al., supra note 68, at 580)).
77. Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow,
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 741 (2013).
78. Manne, supra note 18, at 106; see also Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2287 (“Evaluating both
sides of a two-sided transaction platform is also necessary to accurately assess
competition.”).
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C. The Relationship Between Market Definition and
Standing
In order to establish that allegedly anticompetitive conduct consti-
tutes antitrust injury (i.e., a cognizable harm to competition), the
product or service at issue must be properly defined and the contours
of the relevant market understood.79
Market analysis is part of a chain of antitrust doctrines similarly
linked to the underlying economics of the markets at issue, including:
standing doctrines, market power assessments, the determination of
single entity status, and the choice between per se and rule of reason
analysis. The factual and economic determinations made at earlier
steps in the adjudicatory process inform the subsequent steps and vice
versa. As Alan Meese has observed with respect to the relationship
between the determination of whether a case is amenable to per se
analysis and the subsequent rule of reason analysis if it is not: “[T]he
standards employed at the first step do more than define the class of
restraints subject to immediate condemnation; they also implicitly de-
termine the nature of those restraints that are ‘left over’ and thus sub-
ject to more thorough scrutiny under the second step’s Rule of
Reason.”80 The same is true of other aspects of antitrust process: “Be-
cause [many] steps involve the same ultimate inquiry, the methodol-
ogy employed in [prior steps] should help shape the approach taken in
[later ones].”81
To fully grasp the relationship between Amex and Apple, it is cru-
cial to understand that the distinction between “direct” and “indirect”
made by the Illinois Brick Court implies a particular product market
definition, whether the product market is specified by the parties and
the court or not. Given the linear relationship between the parties and
the simplicity of the relevant products involved, this implied product
market may generally be accurate. But in more complex, nonstandard
circumstances—particularly where intermediaries form precisely to
address the transaction costs that impede direct, linear relation-
ships—the relationships between the parties may be nonlinear, and
the actual product or service relevant to the underlying claim may be
different than the one implied by traditional direct/indirect filters. In
other words, under a different, more-accurate market definition, the
79. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (“[D]etermination of
the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the
Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substan-
tially lessen competition ‘within the area of effective competition.’ Substantially
can be determined only in terms of the market affected.” (quoting United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957))).
80. Price Theory, supra note 20, at 94.
81. Id.
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“direct” and “indirect” labels don’t necessarily reflect either business
or antitrust realities.
As we address further below, market definition and antitrust
standing are interrelated. It is illogical to adhere to a restrictive read-
ing of the latter, if it connotes an economically improper understand-
ing of the former. It does not matter that the standing determination
comes first; it should be incumbent upon courts to evaluate standing
in an economic context that reflects the underlying economic realities.
Following the Court’s approach to market definition in Amex, con-
sistency requires that other doctrines change as well. In Amex, as we
discussed above, “out of market” effects become “in market” effects
and actors on either side of the platform become part of the same ana-
lytical market. This result is critical to cases like Apple because, had
the Court decided it with the economics of two-sided markets in mind,
it would surely have deemed the users it identified as “indirect” and
“direct” purchasers (as if in a traditional, linear relationship) as, in
fact, direct participants on either side of the same market. And, had it
done so, the court on remand would be confronted with analyzing the
effect of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct on both sets of users, as
in Amex. Such a posture would entail a manifestly different analysis
than the one the Court actually identified.
IV. THE COURT’S FAILURE TO INCORPORATE THE
ECONOMICS OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS IN ITS
APPLE INC. V. PEPPER DECISION
Apple presented the Court with its first opportunity to apply the
reasoning underlying its Amex decision in a subsequent case.82 Re-
markably, however, neither the decision nor the dissent mentioned
Amex, or even the two-sided market context in which the transactions
at issue in both cases take place (save for one passing reference to
Apple’s “platform” in the dissent).83 Instead, the Court characterized
the app-user plaintiffs as direct purchasers in a traditional retail con-
text, stating: “It is undisputed that the iPhone owners bought the apps
directly from Apple. Therefore, under Illinois Brick, the iPhone own-
ers were direct purchasers who may sue Apple for alleged
monopolization.”84
While the Court’s approach may constitute a facially accurate ap-
plication of Illinois Brick’s indirect purchaser doctrine, it is inconsis-
tent with the Amex Court’s approach to market definition, as well as
82. The Court’s decision in Apple was released almost a full year after the Court’s
Amex decision, even though it was argued before the Court just three months
after the Court heard oral arguments in Amex.
83. Apple, No. 17-204, slip op. at 5 (U.S. May 13, 2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
84. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2019).
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the spirit of Illinois Brick, which does not stand for the proposition
that any administrative cost reduction is justified, regardless of its ef-
fect on accuracy.
On the first of these, the Court in Amex held that, in order to as-
sess direct evidence of harm, “we must first define the relevant mar-
ket.”85 The Court similarly noted that “[v]ertical restraints often pose
no risk to competition unless the entity imposing them has market
power, which cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines the
relevant market.”86 In Apple, however, the Court assumed the ade-
quacy of its traditional, retail-market conception, which it adopted
without reflection. As a result, the Court implicitly defined both the
product market and the relationship between the alleged buyers and
sellers in that market: “The plaintiffs’ allegations boil down to one
straightforward claim: that Apple exercises monopoly power in the re-
tail market for the sale of apps and has unlawfully used its monopoly
power to force iPhone owners to pay Apple higher-than-competitive
prices for apps.”87
The Court never discussed the relevant product market; instead, it
simply asserted: “we have consistently stated that ‘the immediate
buyers from the alleged antitrust violators’ may maintain a suit
against the antitrust violators.”88 But of what product or service are
the plaintiffs the “immediate buyers” from Apple?
Second, the Court acknowledged three primary, underlying con-
cerns that animated its adoption of the indirect purchaser doctrine in
Apple: “(1) facilitating more effective enforcement of antitrust laws;
(2) avoiding complicated damages calculations; and (3) eliminating du-
plicative damages against antitrust defendants.”89 Based on its pre-
sumed, simplistic nature of Apple’s relationship to App Store
purchasers, the Court asserted that “the three Illinois Brick ratio-
nales—whether considered individually or together—cut strongly in
the plaintiffs’ favor here, not Apple’s.”90
But the Court confused the necessary conditions for the application
of the indirect purchaser doctrine—the above-quoted administrability
concerns—with the sufficient conditions of its application. Merely be-
cause the Court’s approach might support the underlying efficiency
concerns does not mean that all such cases should be decided on that
basis. Indeed, the Supreme Court has elsewhere held that the “eco-
85. Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018) (emphasis added).
86. Id. n.7 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889
(2007)).
87. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1520.
88. Id. (quoting Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U. S. 199, 207 (1990)) (emphasis
added).
89. Id. at 1524.
90. Id.
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nomic assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule might be dis-
proved in a specific case.”91 Platform economics introduces just such a
basis for reevaluating the applicability of those underlying economic
assumptions.
Third, and crucially, Illinois Brick does not stand for the proposi-
tion that courts should sacrifice accuracy for administrability along all
margins. In fact, the first of the three underlying concerns attributed
to Illinois Brick by the Court in Apple is the “effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws.92 While the explicit concern in Illinois Brick was
that “the ‘massive evidence and complicated theories’ involved in at-
tempting to . . . trace the effect of the overcharge through each step in
the distribution chain . . . would [impair] the effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws,”93 antitrust is equally ineffective if limited to inap-
posite evidence and over-simplified theories.
The dissent in Illinois Brick focused much of its attention on what
the holding would mean for optimal deterrence if, as the dissent
surmised, the Court’s approach foreclosed evidence and theories of
harm raised by the parties actually injured by allegedly anticompeti-
tive conduct:
For in many instances, the brunt of antitrust injuries is borne by indirect pur-
chasers, often ultimate consumers of a product, as increased costs are passed
along the chain of distribution. In these instances, the Court’s decision frus-
trates both the compensation and deterrence objectives of the treble-damages
action. Injured consumers are precluded from recovering damages from manu-
facturers, and direct purchasers who act as middlemen have little incentive to
sue suppliers so long as they may pass on the bulk of the illegal overcharges to
the ultimate consumers.94
The same disconnect between standing and injury—and thus the
same impediment to effective antitrust enforcement—will hold true
where, as in Apple, the Court adopts a formalistic standing determina-
tion divorced from the economic realities underlying the relationship
between the parties and the service or product over which they trans-
act. Illinois Brick (and Hanover Shoe) was born out of a particular
business reality in which businesses structured themselves in rela-
tively simple, linear production and distribution chains. The Supreme
Court adopted the indirect purchaser rule as a prudential doctrine
aimed at optimizing the judicial oversight of such cases. It seems
strangely nostalgic to reflexively try to fit new business methods into
old legal constraints when prudence and reality dictate otherwise.
It hardly matters that the Court reached the superficially correct
outcome by allowing the plaintiffs in Apple to proceed with their suit.
91. Kansas, 497 U.S. at 217.
92. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732–41 (1977) (discussing the concern with
effective enforcement of antitrust laws).
93. Id. at 741.
94. Id. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In fact, the Court reached the worst possible outcome: it announced a
rule that permits more plaintiffs to establish standing, but it did so
without an appropriate limiting principle. After Apple, virtually all
platform users are direct purchasers of a platform in cases alleging
antitrust harm arising from transactions with other platform users
mediated by the platform. But this could be both under- and over-in-
clusive if unmoored from a proper understanding of the relevant prod-
uct market. Moreover, if Apple’s disconnect between standing and
market definition extended to the determination of antitrust injury
under Brunswick and its progeny, antitrust standing may not serve to
mitigate the error by limiting the scope of standing to cases in which
the plaintiff’s injury constitutes harm to competition arising from the
defendant’s conduct.
Instead, Apple simply expands standing in a manner unmoored
from the relevant economic—and, indeed, judicial—context. The re-
sult will surely be more enforcement, but it will just as surely not be
more effective enforcement.
A. Campos v. Ticketmaster and the Error of Doctrinal
Formalism
In Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., the Eighth Circuit anticipated
the problem with the Supreme Court’s failure to connect Amex’s mar-
ket definition analysis to Apple’s standing analysis.95 Indeed, the dis-
sent in that case looms large in the Ninth Circuit’s decision,96 which
was overturned by the Supreme Court in Apple.97
In Ticketmaster, plaintiffs—a proposed class of popular music fans
and concert-goers—alleged that Ticketmaster abused its monopoly in
ticket distribution services to force supracompetitive charges on con-
cert venues—a practice that allegedly led to anticompetitive prices for
concert tickets.98 Although not prosecuted as a two-sided market, the
business model is strikingly similar to the App Store model. According
to the plaintiffs, Ticketmaster entered into exclusive contracts with
either (or both) concert promoters or concert venues, giving it effective
monopoly control over ticketing for any large-scale concert at any ma-
jor venue. “Ticketmaster uses that control, according to the complaint,
to extract from the plaintiffs supracompetitive fees for ticket distribu-
95. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998).
96. Pepper v. Apple Inc., (In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.), 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir.
2017), cert. granted sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018), aff’d
sub. nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
97. The authors note that one of the authors of this Article, Geoffrey A. Manne,
worked on the dissent in Ticketmaster as a law clerk to Eighth Circuit Judge
Morris S. Arnold.
98. Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d at 1168.
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tion services,”99 which it charges concert goers when it facilitates
ticket purchases between venues and concert goers.
Unlike the Court in Apple, the Eighth Circuit first undertook a
brief market definition analysis holding that the relevant product
market was the market for ticket purchases not, as the plaintiffs con-
tended, “ticket distribution services.”100 And “ticket buyers only buy
Ticketmaster’s services because concert venues have been required to
buy those services first.”101 Thus, the venues were the parties directly
harmed, and any damage suffered by plaintiffs was a result of passth-
rough from the venues, who were unable to avoid the monopolistic
overcharges.102 For the Eighth Circuit, “such derivative dealing is the
essence of indirect purchaser status, and it constitutes a bar under the
antitrust laws to the plaintiffs’ suit for damages” under Illinois
Brick.103
Important to the Eighth Circuit’s holding, it was immaterial to the
court that Ticketmaster collected its fee directly from consumers
rather than from the venues: “[T]he actual purchase price and the cost
of the service fees amount to the single cost of attending the concert,
regardless of how that cost is divided into actual purchase price and
service fees.”104 Instead, the Eighth Circuit held: “we do not find bill-
ing practices to be determinative of indirect purchaser status.”105
This, of course, is the same species of argument made by the Court
in Apple, although without the benefit of any antecedent market defi-
nition discussion:
Apple’s theory is that Illinois Brick allows consumers to sue only the party
who sets the retail price, whether or not that party sells the good or service
directly to the complaining party . . . .
. . . .
. . . Apple’s effort to transform Illinois Brick from a direct-purchaser rule to
a “who sets the price” rule would draw an arbitrary and unprincipled line
among retailers based on retailers’ financial arrangements with their manu-
facturers or suppliers . . . .
. . . .
. . . Apple’s line-drawing does not make a lot of sense, other than as a way
to gerrymander Apple out of this and similar lawsuits. In particular, we fail to
see why the form of the upstream arrangement between the manufacturer or
supplier and the retailer should determine whether a monopolistic retailer
can be sued by a downstream consumer who has purchased a good or service
directly from the retailer and has paid a higher-than-competitive price be-
cause of the retailer’s unlawful monopolistic conduct.106
99. Id. at 1169.
100. Id. at 1171.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Apple, No. 17-204, slip op. at 7–9 (U.S. May 13, 2019).
2019] THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST DOCTRINE 451
The problem with this approach, in both cases, is that it effectively
rejects consideration of the unique, underlying economics of the rela-
tionship between the parties—the nonstandard business model by
which the allegedly monopolized services are offered. Further, this ap-
proach is directly at odds with the approach the Court took in Amex,
which makes clear that the court should tailor its antitrust analysis to
the underlying market realities:
Because “[l]egal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than
actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law,” courts usu-
ally cannot properly apply the rule of reason without an accurate definition of
the relevant market . . . .
. . . Price increases on one side of the platform likewise do not suggest
anticompetitive effects without some evidence that they have increased the
overall cost of the platform’s services. Thus, courts must include both sides of
the platform—merchants and cardholders—when defining the credit-card
market.
To be sure, the Eighth Circuit in Ticketmaster and the Supreme
Court in Apple were correct to reject the simplistic strawman that
would point to the superficial directness of a relationship to establish
standing: it would not be appropriate to determine either that “a party
who hands the cash over to the defendant is a direct purchaser,” nor
that “a party who pays a price set by the defendant is a direct pur-
chaser.” But it is also inappropriate to ignore the more complicated
dynamics of the transaction to which these different arrangements
may point.
While the majority in Ticketmaster failed to fully appreciate the
relevance and the larger implications of the atypical transaction at
issue in the case, the dissent pointed squarely at the problem:
The monopoly product at issue in this case is ticket distribution services, not
tickets. Ticketmaster supplies the product directly to concert-goers; it does not
supply it first to venue operators who in turn supply it to concert-goers. It is
immaterial that Ticketmaster would not be supplying the service but for its
antecedent agreement with the venues. But it is quite relevant that the ante-
cedent agreement was not one in which the venues bought some product from
Ticketmaster in order to resell it to concert-goers. More important, and more
telling, is the fact that the entirety of the monopoly overcharge, if any, is
borne by concert-goers. In contrast to the situations described in Illinois Brick
and the literature that the court cites, the venues do not pay any portion of
the alleged monopoly overcharge—in fact, they receive a portion of that over-
charge from Ticketmaster.
An unhappy result of the holding in this case is that it is now likely that no
one can bring a Section 4 suit against Ticketmaster in this circuit. The plain-
tiffs in this appeal (and other similarly situated “indirect purchasers”) are the
only parties who are actually injured by Ticketmaster’s alleged illegal price-
fixing, if any. The venues themselves, the parties whom the court seems to
favor as candidates for bringing this Section 4 suit, are not injured, and there-
fore cannot bring an action at all.107
107. Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d at 1174–75 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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Here, Ticketmaster provides an intermediary service (perhaps not
quite a two-sided market, but something close) that stands outside a
traditional manufacturing supply chain. Were it offered by the venues
themselves and bundled into the price of concert tickets, there would
be no question of standing (nor would market definition matter much
as both tickets and distribution services would be offered as a joint
product by the same parties in fixed proportions).
But when unbundled, offered by a third party, priced by the third
party, and sold directly to end-users, it hardly matters that concert-
goers purchase tickets, sold incident to another transaction, from ve-
nues. As noted by the dissent, if there is a monopoly overcharge then
concert-goers bear its effect, and apportionment is not a significant
issue.108 And even though, at the end of the day, the total amount
concert-goers will pay for tickets plus distribution services is the same
regardless of who sells each, the antecedent transaction can be seen as
one in which Ticketmaster and concert venues divvy up Tick-
etmaster’s monopoly spoils—not one in which the venues absorb their
share of Ticketmaster’s monopoly overcharge. Properly assessing com-
petitive effects, requires a broader view: one that incorporates the in-
extricably interrelated relationships, prices, and products on both
sides of Ticketmaster’s services “platform.”
1. The Consequences of the Formalistic Application of Illinois
Brick to New Business Models
The consequences of the Eighth Circuit’s failure to apply the afore-
mentioned “broader view” approach, and thus of its failure to grant
standing for end purchasers, is, contra Illinois Brick, ineffective anti-
trust enforcement. Indeed, as the Ticketmaster dissent notes, such an
approach may actually insulate anticompetitive behavior. And conse-
quently, it may even encourage the adoption of nonstandard commer-
108. Concert-goers do not necessarily bear the full overcharge (if any); venues or con-
cert promoters surely bear some of the overcharge. But, as we discuss below, if
Ticketmaster compensates them from its full monopoly proceeds (if it is indeed
charging supracompetitive prices), they do not likely lose profit on net. And this
is likely the case because, if they did lose profits from the relationship with Tick-
etmaster, they could distribute tickets on their own (as most did before Tick-
etmaster came along) or through other channels. Indeed, as one commentator
notes:
However, venues do have a choice in who sells their tickets, and if a
venue wants they can still sell their tickets through their own sales
channels. . . . TicketMaster didn’t invent convenience fees, but the
money they promised the venues did get funded from new service fees. In
the 1980s TicketMaster charged an additional $2 on top of the ticket
price; $1 went to the venue and $1 went to TicketMaster.
Brett Goldberg, How the Ticket Industry Works: From the Artist to Ticketmaster
to Brokers to You, TICKPICK (Mar. 28, 2014), https://blog.tickpick.com/ticket-indus
try-ticket-resale-ticketmaster/ [https://perma.unl.edu/R2N5-YQPL].
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cial arrangements designed precisely to engage in anticompetitive
behavior:
Under Illinois Brick, an upstream cartel can prevent private litigation as long
as it assures that its direct purchasers downstream benefit more from the ex-
istence of the cartel than they can claim antitrust damages for. Illinois Brick
is instrumental in making this possible . . . By ruling out lawsuits by indirect
purchasers, Illinois Brick enables the cartel to focus side payments on only
the affected parties with standing to sue. The direct purchasers benefit with
the cartel members at the expense of the rest of the chain of production and
final consumers. The cartel is effectively shielded from exposure through pri-
vate litigation by an “Illinois Wall” of direct purchasers.109
Similarly, those who argue in favor of applying Illinois Brick to
prevent the standing of app users in Apple assert that Apple’s alleg-
edly restrictive pricing injures app developers themselves (while users
receive only passthrough injury).110 Therefore, so the argument goes,
it is app developers, not end-users, who should bring suit. But would
they do so, even if Apple were charging supracompetitive prices?
“The rationale of Illinois Brick . . . assumed that, if direct purchas-
ers were given the full overcharge, the direct purchasers would actu-
ally sue, and the indirect purchasers would not.”111 While app
developers may not allege cartel-like behavior in the context of Apple’s
App Store, it remains the case that, taking account of the full spec-
trum of benefits offered by Apple to app developers and the extent of
their ability to pass on Apple’s 30% commission to consumers, they are
unlikely to bring suit.
The possibility of compensation running to direct purchasers suffi-
cient to deter their bringing suit is far from fanciful. Indeed, some
scholars have suggested that exactly this dynamic was at play in the
follow-on class-action antitrust cases against Microsoft in which
“[i]ndirect purchasers brought damage actions against Microsoft Corp.
where state law gave them standing—and Microsoft escaped many
where they did not. Yet, none of the original equipment manufactur-
ers (OEMs) [i.e., Microsoft’s direct purchasers] did [so].”112 Had the
Court in Apple denied standing to app users, it would plausibly have
left no group of plaintiffs with both the ability and the incentive to
challenge the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
109. Maarten Pieter Schinkel et al., Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser
Suits Facilitates Collusion, 39 RAND J. ECON. 683, 684–85 (2008).
110. Brief of Petitioner at 24–25, Apple, slip op. (No. 17-204).
111. William H. Page, Class Certification in the Microsoft Indirect Purchaser Litiga-
tion, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 303, 334 (2005).
112. Maarten Pieter Schinkel et al., Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser
Suits Facilitates Collusion, 39 J. ECON. 683, 695 (2008); see also In re Microsoft
Corp. Antitrust Litig. 218 F.R.D. 449, 451 (D. Md. 2003) (“No OEM or other mem-
ber of the putative class presently in business has instituted an antitrust over-
charge suit against Microsoft.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of
Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 941–42 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW (2001)).
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The Illinois Brick approach runs the risk of error in the platform
(and platform-like) context, regardless of whether the court grants or
denies the plaintiff standing under a simplistic application of its di-
rect/indirect purchaser distinction. The better approach—and the one
the Court sadly failed to consider in Apple—is the one taken by the
Court in Amex: reconsideration of both substantive and procedural an-
titrust doctrine to take account of the economics of novel business re-
lationships. The dissent in Ticketmaster was ahead of its time insofar
as it recognized that the majority’s formal description of the ticket
market was an artifact of viewing what was actually something much
more like a ticket-services platform service operated by Ticketmaster
through the inapt categories established decades earlier.
V. WHAT THE PROPER PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS IN APPLE
INC. V. PEPPER WOULD HAVE LOOKED LIKE
Properly considered, the relevant market analysis for the provision
of app services is an integrated one in which the overall effect of Ap-
ple’s conduct on both app users and app developers must be evaluated.
But, of course, a crucial implication of the Amex decision is that par-
ticipants on both sides of a transactional platform are part of the same
relevant market, and the terms of their relationship to the platform
are inextricably intertwined. Under this conception of the market, it is
difficult to maintain that either side does not have standing to sue the
platform for the terms of its overall pricing structure, whether the spe-
cific terms at issue apply directly to that side or not.
Thus, both end users and app developers are direct purchasers—
even though they are purchasers of different products, they interact in
a single, inextricably interrelated market. Both groups should have
standing. More controversially, the logic of Amex dictates that both
groups should also be able to establish antitrust injury—harm to com-
petition—by showing only harm to either group and
interrelatedness.113
Some clear implications for antitrust procedure follow from the
preceding sections:
1. A plaintiff has a choice to either allege that a defendant oper-
ates as a two-sided market or not during the pleading stage.
2. If the plaintiff so alleges, then, to demonstrate standing, the
plaintiff must show that cognizable injury occurred to some
subset of platform users with which the plaintiff is inextricably
interrelated. Crucially, the plaintiff would not need to demon-
strate injury to herself, nor allege net harm, nor establish the
“directness” of its relationship with the defendant.
113. Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018).
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3. In response, a defendant can contest standing by challenging
the interrelatedness of the plaintiff and the group of platform
users with whom the plaintiff claims interrelatedness.
4. If the defendant does not challenge the allegation that it oper-
ates a two-sided market, it cannot challenge standing by show-
ing indirectness, that the plaintiff has not alleged personal
injury, or that the plaintiff has not alleged a net harm.
5. Once past a determination of standing, if the court accepts that
the defendant is operating a two-sided market, the parties
would be bound to frame their allegations and defenses in ar-
guments consistent with the economics of two-sided markets,
and defendants would not be barred from presenting efficien-
cies defenses based on benefits enjoyed by interrelated users
on any side of the market.
6. This is critical because, whereas alleging a two-sided market
may make it easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate standing,
Amex’s requirement that net harm be demonstrated across in-
terrelated sets of users makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to
make out a prima facie case. The net effect should be more ef-
fective antitrust enforcement. Whether the net effect is more
enforcement is unclear.
7. Finally, a plaintiff who pleads a two-sided market would not be
able to later withdraw this allegation to lessen the attendant
legal burdens.
It may seem premature to consider aspects of the case on the mer-
its in addressing standing.114 But the structure of the market the
court considers must be consistent throughout its analysis. It would
make no sense, for instance, to consider standing in a case as if the
plaintiffs operated in a traditional, vertical supply chain, only to later
evaluate the defendant’s conduct at the merits stage as if it operates
in a two-sided market constrained by the holding in Amex. As a result,
the court must make the standing determination in the context of two-
sided markets in anticipation of the subsequent, substantive determi-
nations. Demands for consistency and the error-cost framework of the
overall analysis, which runs throughout the stages of an antitrust
case, connect the two doctrines.
Here, the two-sided market approach in Amex properly under-
stands that conduct by a platform has relevant effects on both sides of
its interrelated two-sided market. But that stems from the actual eco-
114. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, What’s Next in Apple Inc. v. Pep-
per? The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and the Economics of Pass-Through, CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 249, 268 (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that “the lower court properly ac-
cepted the plaintiffs’ alleged market definition” for purposes of the 12(b)(6) mo-
tion before it).
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nomics of the platform; it is not merely a function of a judicial con-
struct. It thus holds true at all stages of the analysis.
The implications for standing are that users on both sides of a two-
sided platform may suffer similarly direct (or indirect) injury because
of the platform’s conduct, regardless of the side to which that conduct
is nominally addressed. The consequence, then, of Amex’s market defi-
nition approach is that more potential plaintiffs—specifically, plain-
tiffs on both sides of a two-sided market—may claim to suffer
antitrust injury.
Moreover, because of the Amex approach, the problem of analyzing
passthrough that gave rise to Illinois Brick’s indirect purchaser doc-
trine is either mitigated or inevitable. In other words, either the users
on the different sides of a two-sided market suffer direct injury with-
out passthrough under a proper definition of the relevant market or
their interrelatedness is so strong that, complicated as it may be, the
needs of substantive accuracy trump the administrative costs in sort-
ing out the incidence of the costs and courts cannot avoid them.115
That said, Illinois Brick’s administrability concerns are well-taken
and not made irrelevant by a proper, post-Amex standing evaluation.
It is entirely possible, for example, that this approach to Illinois Brick
would lead to platforms and courts being inundated with a surfeit of
expensive and difficult to manage lawsuits. If the net effect of Amex
plus a properly decided Apple were duplicative or poorly founded suits
leading to excessive litigation or overdeterrence, it might well be ap-
propriate to adopt other standing limitations or procedural rules like
mandatory joinder to address the problem.116
A. Procedure Does Not Determine Substantive Outcomes
Although courts must consider some elements of a decision on the
merits in properly evaluating standing in the face of nonstandard bus-
iness arrangements, this does not mean that the standing determina-
tion is outcome determinative. Indeed, on the merits, it seems that
Apple should prevail in Apple.
On the merits of the case, the petitioner in Apple appears to have
had the stronger argument, particularly considering Amex. Had the
Court properly recognized that the App Store is a species of a two-
sided transaction market, Amex directs that respondent has the bur-
den of accounting for harms and efficiencies across both sides of the
market. At least based on the facts as presented in the case thus far,
115. Or, in this case, the complexity of pass-through analysis is absent. See id. at 262
(“To the extent that the marginal costs of producing and distributing another
copy of the app is zero, the theoretical calculation of the markup is far from com-
plete—it is simple.”).
116. See, e.g., Richman & Murray, supra note 55, at 101–03.
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respondents have not remotely met their burden of proving anticom-
petitive effects in the relevant market.117 In fact, if the court on re-
mand properly follows Amex, it seems that respondents have not
alleged facts sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
The core substantive issues in Apple are clouded by Illinois Brick;
however, at the root of the Apple complaint in Apple is that Apple mo-
nopolized the iPhone app market with the effect that it is able to
charge supracompetitive prices to app developers (which are then, to
some extent, passed on to iPhone users). Respondents argue, for in-
stance, that:
Apple’s intentionally closed system prevents competition in the aftermarket
for iPhone apps. iPhone owners who want to unlock the range of functions on
their iPhone have no choice but to shop for apps in the App Store, which en-
ables the App Store to collect a higher price per app than if Apple were forced
to entice app seekers in a competitive market.118
But this does not demonstrate anticompetitive harm. The app prices
charged to iPhone owners are only a part of Apple’s overall pricing
structure and, on their own, indicate nothing about the competitive
effects of Apple’s pricing. And while the alleged mechanism of monop-
oly overcharge turns on the price of the commission Apple charges to
app developers, that price—whether passed through or not—is not the
sum of the effects of Apple’s business model.
What is material is whether Apple’s overall pricing structure
reduces output by deterring app developers from participating in the
market or users from purchasing apps (or iOS devices at all) because
of the amount of the app developer commission. This case has not
demonstrated or alleged that yet.
Most importantly, Apple’s development and maintenance of an in-
tegrated operating system incorporating third-party apps, as well as
its tight control over iPhone users’ access to apps through the App
Store, confer enormous benefits on users (and, indirectly, on app de-
velopers). Apple is competitive in the market because it offers a valua-
ble product to consumers at an (apparently) attractive price.
But Apple was wrong when it tried to distinguish its overall plat-
form benefit from app-specific pricing and app-specific charges to app
developers; they are part of the same whole. Apple asserted that:
Apple does require iOS developers to submit iOS apps to Apple for review for
malware and similar issues. Approved native iOS apps are then distributed
solely through the App Store (otherwise developers could circumvent the ap-
proval process). And for paid apps (many are free), Apple charges developers a
30% commission. However, the developer always independently sets its app
prices. Apple does not set app prices for third-party developers.119
117. See id. at 269 (“Our pass-through analysis demonstrates that, on remand, the
plaintiffs should not, and are unlikely to, prevail . . . .”).
118. Brief for Respondents at 6, Apple, slip. op. (No. 17-204).
119. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Apple, slip op. (No. 17-204).
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This may be true—just as it is true that merchants who accept
American Express cards independently set the retail prices of the
products they sell—but it is not the entire story. Rather, Apple’s over-
all pricing structure includes a component whereby Apple allows app
developers to set app prices, but it also includes relevant prices and
terms set by Apple, including: the price of iOS devices; the commission
charged to app developers; the price of its own iOS apps; the (unavoid-
able) ability for app developers to charge for services outside of the
iOS ecosystem (without paying the thirty percent commission); and
the structure, price, and availability of app marketing in the App
Store.
Adopting the Court’s approach in Amex does not necessarily mean
that Apple should reach the same outcome, however. There are impor-
tant differences between Amex and Apple. First, and most obvious, the
posture of the cases and the doctrines at issue are different. In Apple,
“[r]espondents’ theory is that Apple is charging developers too much
for app distribution, causing the developers to raise app prices.”120 In
Amex, by contrast, the theory was that American Express imposed an-
ticompetitive terms on merchants, enabling American Express itself
to raise the price of its services. Moreover, the plaintiff in Amex was
the government, whereas in Apple the plaintiff was a putative class of
private litigants. While determination of government and private an-
titrust actions on the merits should be essentially the same, they are
each subject to different procedural rules and, in particular, consider-
ably different standing requirements.
More importantly, unlike American Express, Apple does provide
the but-for mechanism for app users to purchase apps. That is, with-
out iOS and iOS devices, there would be no market at all for iOS
apps.121 By contrast, American Express does not provide the platform
upon which retail transactions take place; it provides only a payment
mechanism to facilitate those transactions.
Whatever the implications of these distinctions for the ultimate
resolution of the antitrust questions presented in each case, if the
lower court(s) considering Apple follow the logical implications of
Amex going forward, they do not alter the need for the plaintiffs in
Apple to allege injury and present their prima facie case consistently
with the economic realities of the two-sided market at issue.
120. Brief of Petitioner at 18–19, Apple, slip op. (No. 17-204) (emphasis in original).
121. Of course, iOS does compete with Android, and absent iOS there would still be a
market for Android versions of the apps. Moreover, the presence of Android im-
poses a powerful competitive constraint on Apple’s conduct. But, while crucial for
understanding the competitive conditions confronting Apple, these are still mani-
festly different than those confronting American Express.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court’s fundamental lapse in Apple was its failure to properly
account for the implications of Apple’s nonstandard, two-sided busi-
ness model in assessing the plaintiffs’ antitrust standing. The Su-
preme Court’s decision in Amex lays the groundwork for the correct
basis for granting standing in Apple, which suggests that all stages of
antitrust adjudication should properly account for the unique eco-
nomic realities of the markets at issue. Thus, the Court managed to
reach the right holding in Apple, but for the wrong reason.
Critics have accused the Court of making antitrust cases virtually
unwinnable against two-sided platforms thanks to Amex’s require-
ment that a prima facie showing of anticompetitive effects requires an
assessment of effects on both sides of a two-sided market and proof of
a net anticompetitive outcome.122 While this claim is certainly over-
blown on its face, it also misses a necessary corollary of such an “ex-
panded” market definition in that, relative to previous standing
doctrine, a greater number of prospective parties should have stand-
ing to sue. Apple, although nominally limited to the indirect purchaser
doctrine, presented the Court with an opportunity to grapple with this
logical implication of its Amex decision. It failed to do so.
122. See, e.g., Open Markets Statement on Ohio v. American Express Decision, OPEN
MKTS. INST. (June 25, 2018), https://openmarketsinstitute.org/releases/open-mar
kets-statement-ohio-v-american-express/ [https://perma.unl.edu/39K2-C72X].
